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INTRODUCTION

Health care costs have escalated rapidly since the implementation
of Medicare and Medicaid in 1966.1 Several policymakers attribute this
phenomenon to retrospective cost-based reimbursement since these
policies tend to promote inefficiencies and inflate input prices.2 Fur*Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, College of Business Administration, Georgia State
University; B.A., University of New Hampshire, 1980; Ph.D., University of Florida, 1986; J.D.,
University of Florida, 1986.
**Assistant Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, College of Social Sciences,
Florida State University; B.S., Wake Forest University, 1981; M.A., Vanderbilt University,
1985; Ph.D., Vanderbilt University, 1986.
The authors would like to thank the Graduate Research Committee at Georgia State University College of Business Administration for its support.
1. Annual Handbook of Labor Statistics (1986); Sharkey & Buckle, The Medicare Prospective Payment System: Impact on the Frail and Elderly and an Alternative Reimbursement
Formula, 3 J.L. ETHICS PUB. POL. 227, 228 n.3 (1988) (citing Bureau of Labor Statistics
Historical Tables); Waldo, Levit & Lazenby, National Health Care Expenditures, 8 HEALTH
CARE FINANCING REV. 3, 3-7 (1986). Between the years 1965 and 1985, the CPI rose on
average 6.16%, while the corresponding increase in the medical CPI was 12%. During the same
time period Medicare outlays increased almost 28% annually. See Gibson & Waldo, National
Health Care Expenditures, 4 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 1, 3 (1982).
2. See generally Pauly, Medical Insurance and Hospital Behavior, in NEW DIRECTIONS
IN PUBLIC HEALTH CARE (Lindsay ed. 1976). For example, reimbursements for hospital
inpatient services, which represent 71% of total Medicare expenditures, increased at an annual
rate of 20% during the 1970s.
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thermore, hospital administrators maintain that cost-based reimbursement plans do not pay enough to cover the costs incurred by their
beneficiaries. Consequently, hospitals were forced to raise their
3
charges to privately insured patients to subsidize these costs.
In an attempt to control health care inflation during the 1970s and
early 1980s, some states (New York, New Jersey, Maryland, and
Massachusetts) established mandatory rate setting programs, while
others (Florida and California) advocated more competitive, marketoriented solutions. 4 The most important policy change, however, occurred at the federal level in 1983 when Congress implemented the
Medicare prospective payment system (PPS).5 Prior to Congress' action, Medicare reimbursed hospitals on a cost basis for inpatient services rendered to its beneficiaries.6 Under cost-based reimbursement,
7
Medicare payments were directly related to actual operating costs.
Congress believed that PPS would alleviate the inefficiency and lack
of budget control associated with cost-based reimbursement. Payments
for capital related expenses, however, are still reimbursed on a retrospective-cost basis, although this exemption is likely to be eliminated
in the future. 8 This exemption was made to accommodate those hospitals which might encounter serious financial problems adjusting to a
fixed-rate reimbursement system because the costs of investment projects generally span several years.
Under PPS, the hospital receives a payment that reflects the complexity of each discharged patient's case. Predetermined rates are

3.

Dranove, Pricing by Non-Profit Institutions: The Case of Hospital Cost Shifting, 7 J.

HEALTH ECON. 47 (1986). See also Meyer & Johnson, Cost Shifting in Health Care: An

Economic Analysis, 2

HEALTH AFFAIRS

20 (1983).

4. Some states enacted rate setting laws in the early 1970s. See Cone & Dranove, Why
Did States Enact Hospital Rate Setting Laws, 29 J. LAW & ECON. 287 (1986) (suggesting that
these regulations were implemented in an attempt to keep Medicare payments low); see also
Biles, Schramm & Atkinson, Hospital Cost Inflation Under Rate Setting Programs, 303 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 664 (1980) (rates rose 11.2% annually in states with rate setting programs
compared to 14.3% in states without these regulatory interventions); Shortell & Hughes, The
Effects of Regulation, Competition and Ownership on Mortality Rates Among Hospital Inpatients, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1100 (1988) (both highly regulated states and those with procompetitive policies have higher mortality rates than states without these strategies).
5. Pub. L. No. 98-21, Stat. 65 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1394(f) (Supp. I 1983)). See also 42
C.F.R. § 412 (1987) (current implementation of congressional mandate).
6. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 447 (1984) (description of former retrospective cost reimbursement
scheme).
7. Id.; see also Danzon, Hospital Profits: The Effect of Reimbursement Policies, 1 J.
HEALTH ECON. 29 (1982).
8. See Congressional Budget Office, Including CapitalExpenses in the Prospective Payment
System (1968) [hereinafter CBO Study].
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calculated for 473 diagnostic related groups (DRGs). 9 If this payment
is lower than actual costs, the hospital must absorb the loss; but if
the payment exceeds costs, the hospital is permitted to keep the
difference. Undoubtedly, hospitals will respond to the changes in incentives that accompany this new reimbursement scheme. 10
This article examines the behavioral implications of PPS. Part II
compares cost-based and prospective reimbursement. Part III discusses the economic incentives that accompany prospective reimbursement. Part IV considers the advantages and disadvantages of incorporating capital expenses into the prospective payment.
II.

MEDICARE REIMBURSEMENT POLICY:
LOOK AT THE OLD AND THE NEW

A

A.

Cost-Based Reimbursement

Under cost-based reimbursement, the amount that Medicare paid
hospital for services rendered to beneficiaries was determined by a
reimbursement formula. This mechanism, referred to as the ratio of
charges to charges allocated to costs, 1 operates as follows. First,
overhead costs were allocated among each of the revenue-producing
departments in accordance with the Medicare guidelines. Certain costs,
such as those associated with administration, were allocated in proportion to the direct costs incurred in each revenue-producing department.
The Medicare guidelines disallowed reimbursement of specific overhead costs, such as bad debts to non-Medicare patients. 12
The next step involved calculating hypothetical charges to Medicare
patients for services rendered in each of the revenue-producing departments. This amount was equivalent to what the hospital would receive
if Medicare paid full charges for all its beneficiaries. Similarly, the
hospital then calculated total hypothetical charges in each revenue-producing department for all patients in the hospital (both Medicare and
non-Medicare). The ratio of total hypothetical Medicare charges to

9.

48 Fed. Reg. 39,757 (1983).

10. PPS was phased in over a four year period. This transition period was established to
allow the portion of the DRG rate based on historical cou-t to decline while simultaneously
increasing the component based on national rates. Beginning in fiscal year 1988, payments for
most hospitals were based on national rates. The exceptions were urban and rural hospitals
located in New England and the East North Central divisions, as well as rural hospitals located
in the Middle Atlantic and South Atlantic regions. Medicare payments to these institutions are
85% nationally and 15% regionally.
11. For a more detailed explanation of the process, see 45 C.F.R. § 447 (1984); Danzon,
supra note 7, at 29-33.
12. Danzon, supra note 7, at 29-33.
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total hypothetical charges for all patients was computed for each revenue-producing department. Each department ratio was then multiplied by total department costs to calculate the fraction of costs which
Medicare paid. Finally, Medicare's share of costs in each of the revenue-producing departments were summed to obtain the total amount
13
billed to Medicare.
Allowable costs reimbursed by Medicare were constrained by two
factors. First, Medicare paid a ceiling amount per diem for room and
board services rendered to its beneficiaries. Second, the total costs
incurred by Medicare patients could not exceed hypothetical Medicare
charges. "Relevant hypothetical Medicare charges" were defined as
total hypothetical Medicare charges multiplied by the charge collection
ratio. 14 In other words, Medicare paid the lower of either costs or
charges.
B.

Prospective Payment System

PPS applies primarily to acute care hospitals. Specialty facilities,
such as psychiatric institutions, rehabilitation centers, and long-term
care hospitals are exempt from PPS. Furthermore, rehabilitation, 15
long-term care, 16 psychiatric and alcohol/drug units' 7 of acute care hospitals meeting specific criteria may qualify for exclusion from PPS.
Exempt facilities and units continue to be reimbursed on a cost basis.s
Payments to PPS hospitals are made at predetermined rates per
Medicare discharge for each of the 473 DRGs. The DRG classifications
recognize principal diagnosis, secondary diagnosis, surgical procedure,
age, and sex. The payments, derived from average Medicare per case
costs in 1981, are adjusted to recognize differences in area wage levels,
location classifications (urban versus rural), and teaching activity. The
amount paid to each hospital is the product of a national standardized
amount per case and the appropriate DRG weight or casemix index.
The DRG weights reflect the relative resource intensity, or costliness,
of providing care to Medicare patients in each of the 473 DRGs. 19
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. 45 C.F.R. § 412.23(c) (1987).
16. Id. § 412.23(b).
17. Id. § 412.32.
18. 48 Fed. Reg. 39,761-762 (1983).
19. Standardized amounts are calculated separately for urban and rural hospitals. 42 C.F.R.
§§ 412.101-.104 (1987). Three adjustments are made to determine the per case amount paid to
each hospital. The first adjustment involves multiplying an area wage index by the labor portion
of the standardized amount. Second, rates for hospitals with approved medical education programs are increased by about 8% for each 10% increase in the ratio of residents to beds. Finally,
hospitals serving a disproportionate share of low-income patients receive extra payments. Id.
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Furthermore, PPS makes special payments for "outliers, '' 20 that is,
cases with either extremely long hospital stays or very high costs
relative to the average for the appropriate DRG.
PPS is designed to cover only hospital inpatient services. In contrast, payments for capital, 2 1 direct medical education,2 kidney transplants, 23 outpatient facilities,- and bad debt attributable to Medicare
patients 25 are still reimbursed on a retrospective cost basis. Physician
services are not covered by DRG reimbursement because these services are billed separately. 26
III.

EFFECTS OF DRG REIMBURSEMENT
ON HOSPITAL BEHAVIOR

Under cost-based reimbursement, hospitals had the incentive to
increase length of stay and incur higher costs because they would
receive more revenue from Medicare. In contrast, since the prospective
reimbursement system pays a fixed amount per diagnosis, hospitals
have incentive to reduce length of stay. 7 Hence, many policymakers
contend that DRG regulation will at least partially alleviate health-care
inflation since this system contains the necessary incentives for hospitals to control costs. Nevertheless, the incentives promoting cost consciousness may cause hospitals to act in ways that are harmful to
consumer welfare.2
First, some of the DRG rates are likely to be too low. That is, for
specific diagnoses, the reimbursement rates do not compensate hospi-

20.
longer
21.
22.
23.
24.

42 C.F.R. § 412.80-.82 (1987). "Outliers" are atypical cases having either significantly
stays or significantly higher costs than those of typical cases.
Id. § 412.113(a).
Id. § 412.113(b).
Id. § 412.114.
Id. § 412.1.

25. Id. § 412.115(a).
26. Id. § 405. The government, however, is thinking of altering the way it pays physicians
from a reasonable-cost basis to a prospective basis. See Medicare Plan Would Shift Doctor's
Pay, Wall St. J., Sept. 29, 1988, at 34, col. 2.
27. 42 C.F.R. § 405 (1987). A potential problem will arise if Medicare reduces payments
at a faster rate than technology will allow. This situation, referred to as rate compression, may
cause hospitals to lose money. It is not clear, however, whether this phenomenon is a long or
short run phenomenon. See Lave, Is Compression Occurring in DRG Prices?, 22 INQUIRY 142
(1985). If prices are reduced too much, quality of care will undoubtedly deteriorate. An analogous
situation arises in the case of a landlord owning rental property. The landlord has no incentive
to maintain rental property when the remuneration is too low.
28. Dranove, Rate Setting by Diagnostic Related Groups and Hospital Specialization, 18
RAND J. ECON. 417 (1987).
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tals for legitimate cost variations that exist among categories of patients within a particular DRG category. 29 As a consequence, hospitals
may specialize and treat patients with the lowest expected costs relative to the reimbursement levels. Although this form of specialization
reduces costs, it also distorts output. 30 Rather than developing costsaving technologies that reduce input costs, hospitals have the incentive to screen patients prior to admittance in order to avoid treating
high-cost patients. Thus, by refusing to treat high-cost, low-reimbursement cases, the hospital is able to increase profits. 31 This type of
specialization becomes more difficult, however, as the cost variation
within a DRG category increases. If these circumstances evolve for
several of the more frequently occurring diagnoses, then DRG regulation may prove to be an ineffective mechanism for controlling costs.32
A second problem with DRG reimbursement arises because, as the
rates are calibrated to national levels, hospitals will be prone to shift
costs from Medicare to privately insured patients. In fact, research
shows that nonprofit institutions, which account for eighty-six percent
of the market, raised charges to privately insured patients when Medicare reduced its reimbursement rates.A further complicating factor surrounds the principal/agent relationship between the hospital and physician, and between the physician and patient. Conflicting incentives arise under PPS because the
physician acts as the agent of both the patient and the hospital. Since
physicians choose the level of services for their patients, a trade-off
exists between patient welfare and hospital profits. If physicians value
hospital profits over patient welfare, PPS will result in an underprovision of services. 34 In contrast, under cost-based reimbursement,
many unnecessary procedures were performed since physicians increased hospital profits by providing these services.,

IV.

INCORPORATING CAPITAL EXPENSES INTO THE
PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM

A hospital's capital refers to its physical assets and liabilities, such
as land, buildings, equipment, and debt. Capital costs are the flow of
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 417-18.
Id.
Id.
Id.
33. Dranove, Pricing by Non-Profit Institutions: The Case of Cost Shifting, 7 J. HEALTH
ECON. 47 (1988).
34. Ellis & McGuire, ProviderBehavior Under Prospective Reimbursement: Cost Sharing
and Supply, 5 J. HEALTH ECON. 129, 135-39 (1986).
35. Id.
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recurring expenses (i.e., interest, depreciation, rent, taxes, return on
equity, and costs of leasing equipment) associated with the use of
capital.36 Capital costs, contrary to operating expenses, vary considerably among institutions. The higher variability of capital costs is attributable to the cyclical nature of these expenses. Interest expenses
for investment projects are generally high at first and decline thereafter as the principal is gradually repaid. Another contributing factor
to variability is the increasing costs of construction. Because of high
inflation, hospitals with older facilities and equipment were probably
able to acquire these assets at much lower costs than hospitals with
7
newer facilities.
Medicare reimburses hospitals for a "reasonable" share of capital
related costs associated with the treatment of Medicare beneficiaries.However, cost-based reimbursement for capital expenses has been
severely criticized for at least three reasons. First, it is difficult to
determine the correct amount of capital expenses attributable to Medicare patients.3 9 Second, this reimbursement mechanism contains no
incentives for hospitals to make efficient investment decisions. 40 Finally, under cost-based reimbursement, the federal government has
no control over Medicare payments for capital.41
The first problem arises because estimating capital related expenses and the subsequent calculation of Medicare's share are subject
to a great deal of uncertainty and measurement error. Capital costs
are generally underestimated because depreciation is calculated on the
basis of historical costs rather than replacement costs. 42 Furthermore,

36. Medicare employs the straight-line depreciation method. Thus, annual depreciation cost
is constant and equal to the acquisition cost less salvage value, the sum of which is then divided
by the asset's useful life. After 1989, the return on equity payments to proprietary hospitals
will be eliminated. Moreover, in recent years Congress has enacted across the board reductions
in capital-related reimbursements. Reasonable capital costs were reduced by 3.5%, 10%, and
15% in 1987, 1988, and 1989, respectively. See Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1986 (Pub. L. No.
99-509); Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1987 (Pub. L. No. 100-203).
37. CBO Study, supra note 8, at 10. See generally D. COHODES & B. KINKEAD, HOSPITAL
CAPITAL FORMATION IN THE

1980s (1984); Sloan, Morrisey & Valvona, Capital Growth of

Multihospital Systems, 7 ADVANCES IN HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH 83 (1987).
38. 42 C.F.R. § 412 (1987).
39. This is because the provision of services to Medicare patients and the provision of
service to private insurance patients are essentially joint products. If capital is considered to
be a shared cost in the production of both types of service then there will be no unique method
of allocating the costs of capital expenses to the two groups. S. BERG & J. TCHIRHART,
NATURAL MONOPOLY REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 171 (1989).
40. See generally Danzon, supra note 7. See also Sloan, Morrisey & Valvona, Capital
Growth of MultihospitalSystems, 7 ADVANCES IN HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH 83 (1987).
41. CBO Study, supra note 8, at 1, 17.
42. Id. at 10.
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if a hospital finances an investment project using internal funds, the
implicit interest costs are not included in capital costs. 4 3 Yet, if these
funds are invested in paper assets, then the earnings may be deducted
from interest costs."
Calculating Medicare's share of capital expenses is also a source
of measurement error. The costs of routine services are allocated on
the basis of Medicare's share of total inpatient days whereas the costs
of ancillary services are appropriated using Medicare's share of inpatient charges. Measurement problems arise because the arbitrary accounting rules do not accurately account for unused capital. And, since
occupancy rates have declined significantly over the last decade, the
costs of treating Medicare patients will be overstated.
A second criticism is that cost-based reimbursement insulates hospitals from the normal risks of investment decisions. Since all interest
costs are reimbursed, the hospital administrators have no incentive
to seek out low interest loans. Moreover, Medicare reimburses all
interest and depreciation costs regardless of the occupancy rate. Therefore, hospitals tend to acquire excess capital which subsequently results in underutilized facilities.45 A related concern is that certain
hospitals (especially those with high indigent caseloads) may be unable
to borrow at reasonable costs because they do not generate sufficient
net operating revenues. The current system offers little assistance to
hospitals that are unable to generate capital either through loans or
by issuing bonds. Inadequate funding for investment projects may
result in inefficient as well as low quality care for Medicare patients.
Finally, the current reimbursement structure, which pays for operating costs prospectively and capital costs retrospectively, promotes
inefficiency because it encourages hospitals to invest in capital.46
The third problem is that the federal government has no control
over capital expenses. Since Medicare reimburses whatever costs hospitals incur, capital payments are apt to be unrelated to the level of
services provided by the hospital. As a consequence, capital expenses
may escalate more rapidly than growth in admissions or prices of
other inputs. Operating costs, on the other hand, are more controllable
47
because they are reimbursed a fixed amount per case.

43.
44.
funded
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 6.
Some exceptions exist. For instance, hospitals may retain any interest they earn on
depreciation, endowments, and pension assets.
CBO Study, supra note 8, at 6.
Id.
Ellis & McGuire, supra note 34, at 129-30.
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When PPS was enacted, capital costs were excluded from the DRG
reimbursement schedule.48 This provision was made to accommodate
the wide variance of capital costs among hospitals. As a consequence,
some institutions were required to make larger adjustments for
capital expenses than for operating expenses. 49 An additional concern was that under a fixed-rate reimbursement system, capital payments would not necessarily match capital expenses.- Moreover, lenders might be less willing to finance investment projects if payments
are not directly related to capital costs. 51 These considerations implied

that some hospitals might become financially distressed while adjusting
to the new prospective system, whereas others might receive greater
reimbursements than their actual costs warranted.
Furthermore, reimbursing capital expenses according to fixed-rates
would only reinforce the weaknesses of the current PPS covering
operating costs. Under DRG reimbursement, hospitals have incentive
to avoid treating patients with complicated conditions, and to discharge
patients earlier than medically desirable. 52 This incentive exists because under PPS, hospitals receive little or no additional payments
for treating more complicated cases. Incorporating capital into the
PPS would only exacerbate the tendency of hospitals to engage in
these undesirable actions.
Nonetheless, despite these concerns, it seems inevitable that Congress will establish a DRG reimbursement schedule for capital costs
in the near future.- Expanding PPS to cover capital costs would
alleviate two major shortcomings of cost based reimbursement - inefficiency and lack of budget control. Medicare payments would be
determined by the number of patients discharged rather than by the
costs of treatment. This change in incentives should make hospitals
more efficient in their use of capital. In addition, a fixed-rate reimbursement would enable the Medicare program to keep capital payments under their direct control.
The major reason policymakers have delayed implementing a fixedrate reimbursement system for capital costs relates to the design of

48. 48 Fed. Reg. 39,754 (1983).
49. CBO Study, supra note 8, at 1.
50. Id. at 2.
51. Id. at 16.
52. Friedman, Dumping Dilemma: The Poor Are Always With Some of Us, 56 HOSPITALS
51 (1982).
53. It is likely that Congress will attempt to alter capital reimbursement since Congress
has started to think about the problem and has asked the Congressional Budget Office to make
a preliminary study. See CBO Study, supra note 8, at 1.
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the new payment mechanism. In particular, the primary concern is
how to implement a PPS for capital which has only minimal adverse
effects on hospitals, patients, and the federal budget deficit. For this
reason, many policymakers suggest establishing prospective payment
for capital costs with some type of transition policy.- This approach
represents a trade-off between immediate PPS and cost-based reimbursement.
Clearly, a transition mechanism would help those hospitals which
might become financially distressed under a fixed-rate reimbursement
for capital expenses. A wide range of transition devices could be implemented, either separately or in conjunction with others, to mitigate
some of the potential problems that are likely to occur if a prospective
payment system for capital is adopted immediately. Some alternatives
currently being considered are: enacting prospective payment for capital at some future specified date; exempting certain hospitals; blending
the prospective amount with hospital specific costs; making "outlier"
payments for exceptionally high cost cases; and grandfathering existing
capital and thereby allow continued cost-based reimbursement for capital commitments before some date in the past.55
Besides implementing a combination of these devices, the basic
policies could be adapted in other respects as well. For instance,
movable equipment could be treated differently from buildings and
fixed equipment. One option would be to implement prospective payment immediately for movable equipment because it has a relatively
short useful life. On the other hand, fixed capital such as buildings,
which are generally long lived, could be reimbursed using one of the
transition mechanisms.
V.

CONCLUSION

Under cost-based reimbursement, hospitals had incentive to increase length of stay and render unnecessary services because Medicare reimbursement was directly related to actual costs. Congress
enacted a prospective fixed-rate reimbursement in 1983 to alleviate
the inflation and lack of budget control associated with cost-based
reimbursement. Nonetheless, fixed-rate reimbursement may have deleterious effects on consumer welfare.
Congress has indicated that it is considering expanding PPS to
cover capital related expenses. 56 Originally, these costs were exempt
54. CBO Study, supra note 8, at 33.
55. The advantages and disadvantages of these transition mechanisms are discussed in
greater detail in CBO Study, supra note 8.
56. The CBO Study was requested by the Senate Subcommittee on Health. See CBO Study,
supra note 8, at 1.
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from PPS because policymakers believed that some hospitals would
encounter serious financial problems adjusting to a fixed-rate reimbursement system. 57 Thus, a transition policy was needed to mitigate
any potential adverse effects that might accompany a PPS for capital
expenses.
It should also be noted that cost-based and prospective reimbursement share a common deficiency. Neither approach accurately indicates the amount Medicare should pay hospitals for capital expenses.
The initial prospective amounts for operating costs were established
on the basis of historical costs. If a similar strategy is employed to
establish the prospective rates for capital, then the payments would
be subject to the same measurement and apportionment errors associated with cost-based reimbursement. On the other hand, it would
be even more difficult to set the prospective rates on expectations
regarding future capital requirements.

57.

CBO Study, supra note 8, at 2.

